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Civil Rights and the Cold War 
A Rhetorical History of the Truman 
Administration's Desegregation of the 
United States Army 
Steven R. Goldzwig 
Rhetoric is associated popularly with demagoguery, bombast, empty 
words, "mere rhetoric." In its various emanations from the mouths 
of politicians, rhetoric is even more suspect-prima facie evidence 
for immediate and rancorous distrust and disdain. For people dis-
posed to such popular interpretations of rhetoriC, it is deeds, not 
words, that matter; and such folk often suggest that this is espe-
cially the case in politics. I will take issue with this point of view 
by arguing that rhetoric is action in the world, a very profound ac-
tion that forms the basis of all human decision making and enact-
ment. Rhetoric has ideological, social, and material implications. 
On the strength of persuasive words, people go to war, make peace, 
strengthen or weaken economies, pass programs or pass them up, act 
graciously or brutishly. To get anything accomplished, one must be 
persuaded that it is worth doing, worth the risk. Indeed, peaceful so-
cial change requires rhetorical struggle. Any prescription for individ-
ual or collective change must be argued for. And in argument there 
is agon, struggle. 
An investigation of rhetorical history is especially suited to trace 
this peculiarly human contest because it allows us a special kind of 
knowledge about politics and political actors. By using the unique 
lens of history-through-speech (and speech-as-history), I hope to 
demonstrate the proposition that history, politics, and the contempo-
rary presidency are usefully served by documenting and analyzing 
rhetorical practices. Because rhetorical history "takes rhetoric as its 
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subject matter and perspective," it concerns itself with the role of 
persuasion in the history of ideas, politics, and society. I Rherorical 
history, then, is a special lens for describing and assessing political 
actors, events, and cultures. 
The rationale for doing rhetorical history is itself persuasive. First, 
rhetorical histories allow us a closer look at political actors as word· 
smiths in action. The close textual analysis of letters, memoranda, 
logs, and other forms of recorded documentary evidence often can 
supply scholars with the best evidence of the individual motives, 
methods, beliefs, and values of political actors as they wrestle to 
shape public philosophy and implement public policy. The persuasive 
appeals launched by and directed at preSidents, cabinet members, 
officers, advisors, friends, enemies, interest groups, and various other 
public and private constituencies provide an important nexus for 
the exploration of rhetorical history. It makes a difference who gives 
the advice, who takes the advice, who ignores it, and why. Second, 
rhetorical history is a lens for understanding political cultures. Rhe· 
torical histories assess the sociopolitical and cultural legacy of par· 
ticular administrations and help explain their impact on communal 
memory. In studying the rhetorical dimensions of past proposals and 
poliCies, we chart a common future. In sum, when they are well exe· 
cuted, narrative accounts of contemporary presidencies and adminis-
trations based on rhetorical history are sites for the production of 
further knowledge about the creations, motives, and policies of indi-
vidual presidents and presidencies, the intricacies of the institutional-
administrative arrangements involved, and the cultural Significance 
of such legacies. In short, rhetorical histories mount their own unique 
narratives that leave us the richer for the telling. 
I will demonstrate rhetorical history'S utility through a case study 
of the Truman administration's historic efforts to desegregate the 
United States Armed Services. My particular focus will be on the 
Army, where the opposition to an integrated service was most en-
trenched and therefore the rhetorical struggle most telling. 
Harry S. Truman and Civil Rights: Values and Public 
Philosophy as Discursive Performance 
Harry S. 1l"uman's views on civil rights are most accessible in his 
public address. His words help reveal his character, values, and public 
philosophy. The discourse also serves as a fair barometer of his ex-
pressed civil rights beliefs and therefore helps frame his public ac-
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countability. As William C. Berman notes, "Truman never hesitated 
to pronounce his steadfast loyalty to the ideas of justice and equal-
ity.'" Moreover, "In practically every speech President Truman made 
on civil rights, he pointed out the necessity for Americans to practice 
what they preached, since the world was watching.'" Indeed, the is-
sue of civil rights was important not only in its own right but also 
because of its perceived consequences in international affairs. As 
Richard Dal6ume contends, "Cold War propaganda against the 
United States hit hard at the race problem; State Department expertS 
estimated that nearly half of the Russian propaganda against the 
United States was focused on this issue alone.'" With Truman's as-
sistance Jim Crow was transmogrifying into a formidable diplomatic 
dilemma. 
Truman's civil rights philosophy can be adduced in various pub-
lic speeches and commentaries. During the 1940 election year, for 
example, Truman stated: "In giving to the Negroes the rights that are 
theirs, we are only acting in accord with ideas of a true democracy. ,,' 
Berman judged such discourse "a model of sobriety and good taste," 
especially "when measured against typical southern utterances on 
civil rights" at the time." 
The Truman presidency was witness to events, however, that 
seemed to erode both the law and social relations. The president be-
came increasingly convinced of the need for a major civil rights ini-
tiative_ On June 26, 1946, President Truman sent a message to the 
NAACP's annual convention. He assured participants that the ballot 
was a sacred right and that any form of organized terrorism against 
the franchise was nothing less than intolerable in a free democratic 
society. Yet the South would not become, by any stretch of the imagi-
nation, a willing partner in equal Citizenship for African Americans. 
Indeed, vigilante violence and murder perpetrated by white southern 
nightriders seemed a chilling reminder of the vengeance of those who 
opposed the gathering forces of social change. ' 
After the crushing off-year election defeat of Democrats in the 
1946 Congress, Truman issued Executive Order 9008, which created 
a presidential civil rights committee. As Berman indicates, Truman 
"undoubtedly wanted to see 'fair treatment' extended to all citizens. 
It is not likely, however, that he wished to upset his working relation-
ships with the South in "December, 1946, in order to support such an 
objective. Yet by establishing a civil rights committee, Truman inad-
vertently built up political pressure that could spell trouble for him 
in the future. lIS 
In his State of the Union Address on January 6, 1947, Truman an-
nounced that present civil rights abuses would require federal legis-
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lation: "We have recently witnessed in this country 'numerous at-
tacks upon the constitutional rights of individual citizens as a result 
of racial and religious bigotry, . .. I have, therefore, by Executive or-
der established the President's Committee on Civil Rights, with a 
view to making recommendations to the Congress.'" Not coinciden-
tally, in this same address Truman declared that despite having de· 
mobilized the armed services in 1946, the nation still would "need 
well-equipped, well-trained armed forces and we must be able to mo· 
bilize rapidly our resources in men and material for our own defense 
should the need arise." Significantly, the president noted, "We are 
encountering serious difficulties in maintaining our forces even at 
these reduced levels ." Truman's military advisors were warning him 
that he might have to reinstitute the draft. The Selective Service law 
in force at the time was scheduled to expire on March 3 1. iO 
On January 15, 1947, the president commissioned his civil rights 
committee; on January 16 he announced that the three services had 
reached an agreement on the plan to unify the armed forces. At first 
glance these two activities would seem to be unrelated. However, on 
March 12, 1947, Truman deliver.ed his "Special Message to Congress 
on Greece and Thrkey: The Truman Doctrine." Therein Truman de-
clared the United States ready, willing, and able to take up its role 
as the defender of the free world. As a result the state of military 
preparedness would become one of the key foreign policy issues 
of the Truman administration. Because civil rights abuses now con-
stituted an obstacle to an efficient and effective fighting force, they 
now took on added urgency. 
The convergence of civil rights, the emergent cold war, and U.S. 
armed forces preparedness is perhaps best elaborated in Truman's 
historic June 29, 1947, address to the NAACP. In this landmark 
speech the president would stake out an unprecedented role for the 
federal government in the civil rights arena. Truman spoke of a " turn-
ing point in the long history of our country's efforts to guarantee 
freedom and equality to all our citizens." Truman stated, "the exten-
sion of civil rights today means, not protection of the people against 
the Government, but protection of the people by the Government." 
The president clarified the mission: "Our immediate task is to re-
move the last remnants of the barriers which stand between mil-
lions of our citizens and their birthright. There is no justifiable rea-
son for discrimination because of ancestry, or religion, or race, or 
color." Truman declared emphatically, "Our National Government 
must show the way! "" Truman underlined the foreign policy impli-
cations of vigilance toward civil rights at home: "Our case for democ-
racy should be as strong as we can make it. It should rest on practical 
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evidence that we have been able to put our own house in order ... . 
We can no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely attack upon preju-
dice and discrimination." " Given Truman's prior public statements 
and the president'S own predilections in foreign affairs, it seemed 
natural to cast civil rights in this light. As the president saw it the 
United States's first obligation was to "put our own house io order." 
Only then could Americans credibly promote Western-style democ-
racy and confidently solicit the allegiance of the world community 
to democratic principles and practices. The link between practicing 
civil rights at home and fostering democratic principles abroad would 
have profound implications for generations of Americans in their 
thoughts on war, peace, and race relations in the United States. 
On February 2, 1948, basing his policy on the recommendations 
of his October 1947 civil rights committee report, To Secure These 
Rights, the president delivered yet another unprecedented civil rights 
address. Striking a calm, dignified, humane tone, Truman asked Con-
gress for additional authority to act on pressing issues, which in-
cluded establishing a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, 
strengthening existing civil rights laws by securing federal protec-
tion against lynching, insuring voting rights protections, impaneling 
the long-delayed Fair Employment Practices Commission, and enact-
ing measures prohibiting discrimination in interstate transporta-
tion. 13 The president also indicated his resolve to fortify federal non-
discrimination policy. Regarding U.S . armed forces, in particular, the 
president remarked pointedly: "During the recent war and in the 
years since its close we have made much progress toward equality of 
opportunity in our armed services without regard to race, color, reli-
gion, or national origin. I have instructed the Secretary of Defense to 
take steps to have the remaining instances of discrimination in the 
armed services eliminated as rapidly as possible. The personnel poli-
cies and practices of all the services in this regard will be made con-
sistent." I. Recognizing its propaganda potential, the government car-
ried the president's address over Voice of America. Berman observed 
that "the civil rights message now entered the cold war arena as a 
document of diplomacy. At home it immediately became a source of 
major political controversy.,,15 
Although the president'S civil rights legislation would founder on 
the shoals of powerful; at times virulent, southern opposition in Con-
gress, the military reform he contemplated was a matter of execu-
tive responsibiliry; presidential action required no congressional ap-
proval. Truman's authority to issue an executive order would enable 
him to make his most indelible mark on civil rights policy by target-
ing continuing forms of discrimination in the military. 
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The Fahy Committee: 
A History of Institutional Warfare 
On July 26, 1948, a day prior to convening a special session of Con-
gress to attend to ongoing national problems of inflation and hous-
ing, Truman issued Executive Orders 9980 and 9981. As Berman 
notes, both orders were directly tied to the upcoming campaign 
and election: "The Truman orders were timed perfectly . .. to focus 
attention on Congress. And, concurrently, to undercut [Progressive 
Party candidate Henry] Wallace's standing with many Negroes. "i6 
Executive Order 9980 authorized a federal review board for investi-
gating discrimination in federal government employment practices. 
The Fair Employment Board was set up as an arm of the Civil Service 
Commission. It sought to review cases, supervise compliance, and 
adjudicate appeals. It had no direct enforcement powers-save im-
ploring the president to take additional action whenever and wher-
ever he deemed necessary. " Executive Order 9981 directed new ef-
forts at equal opportunity in the armed forces and created the 
President's Committee on Equaliw of Treatment and Opportunity in 
the Armed Services, which was authorized to begin oversight tasks. 
Significantly, the order made no mention of segregation. It was im-
possible to tell whether the order was intended to achieve an inte-
grated armed services. The executive orders predictably raised the ire 
of southern Democrats for going too far and the suspicions of the 
black community for not going far enough.18 After issuing the two 
orders Truman appeared in person before Congress the next day to 
outline his eight-point legislative package, which also included civil 
rights provisions. The response was "noticeably cool. " I. 
At the time Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9981, "the 
racial scene in the services was scandalous, if viewed from any per-
spective of fairness ."w The order read in part: "There shall be equal-
ity of treatment for all persons in the armed services without regard 
to race, color, religion, or national origin. This policy shall be put 
into effect as rapidly as possible, haVing due regard to the time re-
quired to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing effi-
ciency or morale. " Truman directed his committee " to examine the 
rules, procedures, and practices of the armed services in order to de-
termine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be 
altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this 
order." The committee was charged with executing its duties "until 
such time as the President shall terminate its existence by Executive 
order. ,,21 As Dalfiume notes, "BaSically, the President's committee 
was a liberal one. " ll 
What came to be known as the Fahy Committee would work with 
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the various branches of the armed services in planning and imple-
menting a fair and equitable process for eliminating the entrenched 
apartheid of the status quo. The Navy and Air Force were already 
making substantial progress toward integration, so the main stum-
bling block resided with the Army. Whether or not it was admitted, 
or even foreseen, the president's order would become the opening 
salvo in a great social experiment. The daunting task before the com-
mittee was simple in its complexity: to see if people serving in a 
democracy could get along with each other and to erase the long-
standing color line in the nation's military. As directed by President 
Truman, this experiment in human relations was now a federal mis-
sion and responsibility. 
EARLY STIRRINGS OF ARMY OPPOSITION. One month before the formal 
appointment of the Fahy Committee membership, the Army was pre-
paring to release its own report, "The Negro in the Army." In late 
August of 1948 the Army pressed to have this report released imme-
diately in an effort to upstage a report with recommendations to be 
issued by black leaders, such as Lester Granger of the Urban League, 
who had met with Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal in late 
April to discuss means of redressing ongoing racial problems in the 
military." Presidential advisor Philleo Nash informed Clark Clifford 
that the Army's report was "carelessly executed" and contained "sev-
eral deficiencies" and "old statistics." Even more damning from 
Nash's perspective, the Army's report made no mention of the presi-
dent 's newly announced committee.24 Clifford, also fretting over the 
Army report 's contents, timing, and reception, issued a memo to Sec-
retary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall: "Since the Defense Establish-
ment seems to feel strongly that this report should be made public in 
advance of the recommendations of the Granger group, we will not 
object .. . provided that it is accompanied by a statement that it cov-
ers the situation prior to the issuance of the recent Executive Order 
on Equality and lfeatment of Opportunity in the Armed Services . ... 
My personal recommendations would be that the Granger recom-
mendations and this report be released simultaneously. ,,25 
Although the Committee would not meet formally until January 
of 1949, the effect of the president's order was immediate and pro-
found. On the positive side of the ledger, Donald S. Dawson, an ad-
ministrative assistant, would inform the president, "Since your Ex-
ecutive Order was issued, all important opposition to the draft on the 
basis of the Army's race policy has disappeared ... . Negro leaders and 
their white friends have been universal in their praise."" 
Secretary of the Army Royall, however, was worried about the com-
position of the president's committee. He complained to Truman: 
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"[A] number of [those] being considered ... have publicly expressed 
their opinion in favor of abolishing segregation in the Armed Ser-
vices . At least one of them, Lester Grainger [sic !, has been critical 
both of the Army and of me personally on this particular matter. I 
feel strongly that no person should serve on this Committee who h"s 
formed a fixed opinion on this subject on either side .... I would like 
an opportunity to discuss this matter with you personally before ap-
pointments are made. ,,27 
On October 21, 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal notified 
the military service secretaries of the Fahy Committee plans. At that 
time the president's committee expected to meet for the first time 
in mid-November and anticipated completing its work within two 
months. Meanwhile, as chair, Judge Charles Fahy had requested back-
ground materials. Forrestal directed "each Department [to] designate 
one of its Assistant Secretaries as the official point of contact for the 
Department with Mr. Fahy's Committee." He also advised the assis-
tant secretaries to work with "one ranking Negro officer" and with 
the members of the Armed Services Personnel Board." 
A NEW PLAN. On December 2, 1948, after a series of delays, Secretary 
of the Army Kenneth C. Royall submitted to Defense Secretary For-
restal an experimental Army integration plan: "I propose, but only if 
similar action is taken by the Navy and the Air Force, to establish 
a completely non-segregated Army post with approximately 5,000 
officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the following units: 
(1) One infantry regimental combat team. (2) One engineer battalion. 
(3) One station hospital and medical complement. (4) One post head-
quarters. Of the enlisted men, roughly 10% will be Negro, this be-
ing approximately the average proportion in the Army at present." 
Royall thought it important to create "widespread understanding of 
the project" while Simultaneously preventing "too much publicity or 
non-representative publicity." He advised Forrestal to limit press vis-
its. The experiment, which became known as the Royall Plan, was 
meant to test the willingness of troops to serve in integrated units, 
the efficiency and combat value of such an arrangement, the implica-
tions for the command structure, any ensuing social, morale, or dis-
cipline problems, opportunities for African American advancement, 
and finally, whether the experiment could be generalized to the Army 
as a whole.2• Designed to demonstrate "progress" on the race issue 
and to counteract the Fahy initiatives, the Royall plan was distributed 
to the other branches of the service for review and comment. 
Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington, in responding to 
the Royall Plan, was less than enthusiastic. In a memorandum to For-
restal he observed: "The experiment will not be conclusive. There are 
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so many artificial features involved that success or failure of this ex-
periment would not be predictive of success or failure under other 
conditions .... The public relations aspects ... are particularly un-
desirable. By its very nature, the attention and searching scrutiny of 
the Negro press and various pressure groups would be focused upon 
this activity which, through its artifiCiality, is of minimal military 
significance but of major significance in the current public contro-
versy on purely racial issues." Symington contended, on the other 
hand, that the Air Force was in a position to conduct such an experi-
ment because it already had trained black technicians in place to 
meet the call for 10 percent representation and he anticipated no so-
cial or morale difficulties'o 
Acting for the secretary of the Navy, John Nicholas Brown's re-
sponse was similar to that of the Air Force. The Navy felt the experi-
ment "will certainly create widespread publicity ... [that would be 
in] large portion . .. adverse and non-constructive in nature. With re-
gard to the Navy the assignment of Negro personnel is made without 
reference to the race of the individual. [Indeed,] very satisfactory 
progress has been made in the Navy and the Marine Corps without 
creating problems of morale and discipline or lowering the esprit de 
corps. 1I3l 
Because both the Air Force and the Navy seemed to be moving for-
ward on the president's executive order without much prodding, even 
before the Fahy Committee formally convened, the Army seemed, by 
contrast, all the more mired in the so-called "Negro problem." Much 
of its trouble seemed to stern from inflexibility. The officers them-
selves seemed most intransigent. Whether Secretary of the Army 
Royall knew his plan would be unacceptable to his sister services is 
unknown. Royall may have insisted that the Air Force and the Navy 
had to go along with his plan knowing that, given their different situ-
ations, there would be little agreement. In this way the "experiment" 
would be scuttled." 
The Rhetorical Battles of 1949 
The symbolic import of Executive Order 9981 was widespread. Yet 
the mere proclamation of equality in the armed forces did not make 
it a reality. Six months had passed and it was still unclear whether 
Truman had partial or total desegregation in mind. Nor was it en-
tirely clear what impact the order might have on the armed services. 
Another hard round of persuasion was about to begin as the Fahy 
Committee began the arduous task of implementing Truman's order. 
The president met with the Fahy Committee on January 12. A text 
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drafted for Truman's use in addressing the committee is instructive 
regarding the administration's philosophy: 
OUI total national economy demands the most effective utilization of 
every citizen. Likewise it is the privilege and responsibility of every citizen 
to make the maximum possible contribution to OUf national strength . The 
concept of democracy that our nation represents to the peoples of the world 
demands that there be equality of treatment and opportunity in the armed 
services as well as in other phases of our national life. The Committee will 
wish to make a comprehensive survey of the past and present status and 
service of the Negro citizen in the armed services . . .. It is my profound de-
sire that the work of this Committee shall yield results which will not be 
simply a report, but a set of operable plans, a blueprint, for constructive ac-
tion. The national security requires that you make your contribution, COD-
sistent with the fundamental ~hts of all men, toward the full development 
of the strength of our country. 
In highlighting the economic and national security aspects of the 
committee's responsibilities, Truman rhetorically subordinated indi-
vidual civil rights to the collectiv.e national welfare. Post-World War 
II national pragmatics trumped the larger moral questions. These ar-
guments also were uniquely tailored to counteract m ilitary opposi-
tion. 
At the actual January 12 meeting, which lasted ten minutes, uu-
man told the committee: "I have asked you ... to serve on this com-
mission in an effort to expedite the thing in the Government Service 
so that you can actually carry out the spirit, as well as the letter of 
the order [no. 9981] .... I'm satisfied that with this sort of setup we 
can get the thing working as it should work. " In requesting a unified 
and consistent policy, Truman seemed to have in mind something 
beyond a simple concern with the armed services. His vision for civil 
rights in America was expansive: " I want this rounded out a little bit. 
I want the Department of the Interior, the Commerce Department, 
the Treasury Department, interviewed on the subject [of] why you are 
in existence, and let 's make it a Government proposition, as well as 
an Armed Services [one]." Indeed, uuman's expressed intention was 
deCidedly not to merely " limit it to just one branch of the Govern-
ment. That's what I have in mind all the way down the line. Not only 
that, I think we've got to go further-not at this time, but later- and 
see that the state and local governments carry out the spirit of the 
laws which we hope to get on the books down here during this ses-
sion of Congress." As envisioned by the president at the time, the 
armed services would become a model for the nation. 
The president appeared wary of the negative publicity that could 
follow the committee's formal and informal investigative work: "I 
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want it done in such a way that it is not a publicity stunt. I want 
concrete results-that's what I'm after- not publicity on it. I want 
the job done and I want to get it done in a way so everybody will be 
happy to cooperate to get it done. Unless it is necessary to knock 
somebody's ears down, I don't want to have to do that, but, if it be-
comes necessary, it can be done. But that's about all I've got to tell 
you." 
numan's was a tall order given the history of the services and their 
demonstrated lack of cooperation with each other in prior encoun-
ters over the desegregation issue. Still, the tone had been set. A no-
nonsense approach would be adopted by the Fahy Committee. The 
president "hoped" the committee could get back to him with a report 
by June 1, "and then," he said, " if it is necessary to continue, why, we 
can go on from there, in order to give you plenty of time. I'd like to 
have the outline of the situation before the Congress adjourns in case 
we need to ask for any legal amendments to the law because, in that 
hearing, at that time, we will endeavor to pass the Civil Rights Pro-
gram as outlined in my message on the subject in the last Congress. 
I hope to get some concrete results of that in the Eighty-first Con-
gress, 1134 
On January 18 E. W. Kenworthy, executive secretary of the Fahy 
Committee, voiced confidence in the ongoing informal develop-
ments since the issuance of the president's executive order: "I think 
the President's Committee has done pretty well on this. The Army 
has now accepted three of our four recommendations----on opening 
schools and jobs, and on assignment to any unit-and there remains 
now only the fourth recommendation, the elimination of the 10 per 
cent quota. I am sure we will get that too. ,, 35 Kenworthy had engaged 
in a bit of wishful thinking; a much longer struggle lay ahead. This 
was brought home most forcefully to the Fahy Committee at its 
March 28 meeting. 
"EXCEPTIONALLY AND PEC ULIARLY QUALIFIED." On March 28, 1949, 
Judge Fahy's committee was anxious to talk with the service secre-
taries on a number of items, including 11) whether the earlier Gillem 
Report IWD Circular 124) "envisageldl the eventual elimination of 
segregation"; 12) the secretaries' interpretation of Executive Order 
9981; 13) whether there was a need for a "unified policy on utilization 
of Negro manpower"; 14) whether the Fahy Committee should hear 
testimony from the joint services' Personnel Policy Board; 15) the sec-
retaries' ideas and suggestions regarding administration and imple-
mentation of new policy; and 16) specific questions for Secretary Roy-
all on the "policy and practice" of Generals Clay and MacArthur. J6 
At the meeting Secretary Royall, armed with a lengthy statement, 
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reiterated Army arguments for continuing segregation. He rehearsed 
the long-standing racist viewpoints common at the time: 
The Army is not an instrument for social evolution . ... Applied to the 
question of segregation, the criteria must be what produces the greatest and 
most effective use of all our manpower . .. so that we may place a winning 
Army on the battlefield .... The history of two wars has demonstrated that 
in general Negro troops have been less qualified than white troops for the 
pe.rformance of certain types of military service, for example, service with 
the infantry or with other units requiring troops I/close with the enemy. II 
On the other hand, there are undoubtedly other functions for which Negro 
troops are exceptionally and peculiarly qualified. Motor or ship transport 
service might be given as examples. It follows that in the interest of efficient 
national defense certain types of units should be entirely or largely confined 
to white troops, and that where Negroes are assigned to any of those units, 
they should be carefully selected . 
Royall also maintained that an integrated Army posed morale prob-
lems. He argued that troops engaged in war must "have confidence 
both in their leaders and in the ql.en that are to fight by their sides"; 
thus, "in close personal relationships such as exist in an Army unit, 
voluntary segregation is normal in ordinary civilian relations. And 
this is true even in those localities where no type of segregation is 
required by law." Royall contended, "In this connection we must re-
member that a large part of the volunteers in the Army are southern-
ers-usuallya larger proportion than from any other part of the coun-
try. Whether properly or not, it is a well known fact that close 
personal association with Negroes is distasteful to a large percentage 
of Southern whites." Therefore, "abandonment" or "sudden change 
in .. . the Army's partial segregation policy would . .. adversely af-
fect enlistments and reenlistments not only in the South but in many 
other parts of the country, probably making peacetime selective ser-
vice necessary." Royall thus raised the specter of racial resistance 
weakening military preparedness. 
According to Royall one of the "most difficult" problems was get-
ting white soldiers "to serve under Negro officers or particularly un-
der Negro non-commissioned officers." He argued that black enlist-
ments did not suffer under the present policy and that the Army was 
taking steps to improve opportunities for advancement. "As a matter 
of fact," Royall boasted, " the progress of the Negro in the Army-and 
his present status-is superior to that which he occupies in any other 
department of the Government-military or otherwise. Nowhere 
else does the Negro hold as many positions of importance and respon-
sibility." This latter argument had been an old saw. 
Despite his negative declamations, Royall said the Army was still 
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willing to make "such adjustments as are necessary from time to 
time to meet changing conditions." Royall concluded that the Army 
had initiated" the best practical method of handling-and gradually 
narrowing-the segregation problem." He thought it inappropriate 
"to force a pace faster than is consistent with the efficiency and mo-
rale of the Army-or to follow a course inconsistent with the ability 
of our Army, in the event of war, to take the battlefield with reason-
able assurance of success."" Royall's testimony must have shaken all 
but the most inveterate optimists on the Fahy Committee. Members 
had thus far demonstrated themselves to be steely-eyed realists, how-
ever, so it was also highly unlikely that they would fold up their 
tents. They were committed for the duration. And change was in the 
wind. 
That same day, March 28, Louis A. Johnson formally replaced an 
ailing, overworked, and increasingly befuddled James Forrestal, who 
had submitted his letter of resignation as Secretary of Defense on 
March I, 1949.38 On April 6 Secretary Johnson issued a memoran-
dum to all secretaries of the armed services and the chair of the per-
sonnel policy board announcing some "supplemental" policies pur-
suant to equal opportunity. Provision lb. 13) seemed to add a new 
wrinkle: "Some units may continue to be manned with Negro per-
sonnel; however, all Negroes will not necessarily be assigned to Ne-
gro units. Qualified Negro personnel shall be assigned to fill any type 
of position vacancy in organizations or overhead installations with-
out regard to race. II 
The new policy proved controversial. The pivotal word here was 
organizations. Army policy had previously limited the employment 
of blacks in desegregated units to "overhead" tasks, which included 
menial duties such as housekeeping, laundry, commissary duty, and 
the like. The word organizations could be interpreted as increasing 
opportunities, and as written the new directive seemed at odds with 
existing Army policy; however, the Fahy Committee only learned of 
its existence from Johnson on April 18, when he declined an invita-
tion to testify at the committee's April 26 meeting. Johnson argued 
that his appearance would be "premature" and "unprofitable" be-
cause he had not had time to assimilate" the details of this difficult 
problem." Johnson did promise to examine present poliCies, to solicit 
statements from' the service secretaries, and to have them reviewed 
by the personnel board "to determine their adequacy. ,,3. 
Johnson's new order proved vexing to the Fahy Committee, which 
not only suffered such unilateral action but now risked being pre-
empted. Johnson's directive inspired increased vigilance as the com-
mittee pondered counter moves and carefully calibrated the public 
relations ramifications involved. johnson's order also induced a healthy 
Desegregation of the Army I ISS 
skepticism toward continuing the present course of action, a skepti-
cism further encouraged by the evolution of the negotiations with the 
Army, the suspicion that the numbers submitted by the Army did not 
convey the full extent of the ongoing problems, and the Fahy Com-
mittee's own investigations. As one thoughtful person in an unsigned 
memorandum to Charles Fahy suggested, "I now think that we better 
jump from battalion to man-to-man integration .. . . The new policy 
is nothing but the old practice in small print .. . . Our visit to Meade 
convinced me that while Negroes are indeed being put into overhead 
installations, they are not being assigned in anything like the num-
bers they could be." The author seemed to have his hand on the true 
pulse of the dilemma: 
Secretary Johnson'S memo raises real problems for the Committee . ... Ex-
cept for a flat statement eliminating aJJ segregated units, there is not much 
by way of a policy statement that the Committee could make which would 
go beyond the Secretary's. Therefore, the Committee must concentrate on 
procedural matters in its recommendations. I do not know what procedures 
the three services will propose in reply' to Johnson'S memo-I daresay noth-
ing very revolutionary. But I think it would be very bad if the Fahy Commit-
tee proposed concrete steps which seemed to fall short of the Johnson policy . 
. . . Perhaps it isn't a policy .... But the press and the public think it is a pol-
icy, and they think it is a promise .... We have been put in a tough spot. 
In anticipating an upcoming interim report for President Truman, 
the writer advised Fahy to issue "recommendations on the Army 
only. The reason ... is that our thinking is likely to be pretty con-
clusive on the Army. Therefore, if there are leaks-and there are 
bound to be-at least the recommendations will stand examination. 
I would want to know a lot more about the Navy and the Air Force 
before I submitted any recommendations, even in an interim re-
port."'" Nevertheless, under the committee's continuing pressure, 
the "yeast ... [seemed] to be working." The Army was now "consid-
ering the abolition of quotas." Moreover, "if men ... [were[ assigned 
on the basis of their MOS [Military Occupational SpeCialties!. regard-
less of race," then reason argued that segregation would "come tum-
bling of its own weight. ,,41 
INITIAL RE COMMENDATIONS AND INTERIM REPORT. The initial rec-
ommendations drafted by the Fahy Committee ori May 24 detailed 
the process of prying open the closed opportunities in the present 
system. Perhaps most important, and most difficult of all, was the 
committee's call for the abolition of racial quotas as promulgated by 
WD Circular 124 (a.k.a. the Gillem Board Report) and the substitu-
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tion of intelligence test classifications la.k.a. General Classification 
Tests, or GCTs). As the Fahy Committee noted, "The [presentJ quota 
system does not implement, but goes far to defeat, the Army's de-
clared policy in Circular 124." The Army complained that the higher 
enlistment scores required by the Navy and the Air Force resulted in 
the Army's securing a higher percentage of men in the two lowest 
test score categories IClass IV and Class V). One preferred solution 
was simply to make "the entry intelligence score for the three ser-
vices . .. the same."42 
Responding to Defense Secretary Johnson's call to reexamine ser-
vice policies, Acting Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, who served 
as Royall's successor, issued a vigorous defense of Army implemen-
tation of policies under the Gillem Board regulations. Gray was espe-
cially wary of changing the quota system based on test scores, argu-
ing that this would reduce the number of recruits dramatically: "The 
Army currently limits Negro enlistments to their civilian popula-
tion ratio, about 10 percent .... There is a definite limit to the num-
ber of men with low GCT's that the Army can absorb ... . Without a 
quota system of any kind, Negro membership could rise easily to 30 
or 40 percent." Gray advised Johnson: "There is a growing concern 
among many senior officers ... that we are weakening to a dangerous 
degree the combat efficiency of our Army. These officers are familiar 
with the combat performance of Negro troops during war and feel 
that we have already gone too far in inserting colored organizations 
in white combat units. ,,43 
On June 7, in a follow-up report to the president, the Fahy Commit-
tee indicated it had made "considerable progress." Admitting that the 
Army's second plan "did not go beyond the framework of its present 
policy and practice," the committee assured the president that it 
"[expectedJ to have further conferences" and asked for a delay in is-
suing their required interim report while they tried to negotiate 
pending matters. Truman granted this request.« 
Army intransigence was much more serious than the progress re-
port indicated. As Kenworthy complained to Fahy, "The Army is de-
termined to do nothing about guaranteeing that Negroes completing 
school courses will be used regardless of race." Kenworthy lamented, 
"I do not see how the Army can expect to keep its segregation policy 
inviolate when the Navy and the Air Force have abandoned segrega-
tion as a policy. The beginning on integration which the Committee 
has recommended, it seems to me, is modest, gradual, and calculated 
to improve the Army's use of manpower. I cannot see how it could 
cause the Army any embarrassment or lower its efficiency. ,,45 
Kenworthy's frustration was based on both short-term and long-
term concerns. Achieving cooperation on desegregating the services 
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was in the interest of African Americans and in the national interest 
of efficient use of personnel; however, this issue also had a direct 
bearing on the reorganization of the postwar military establish-
ment. 46 The monumental postwar restructuring of the American de-
fense system was materially jeopardized by an unfathomable, un-
wieldy, and, for many, embarrassing resistance to change. At the 
dawn of the cold war the Army's recalcitrance created an immobi-
lizing effect. In rejecting a third Army plan, dated July 6, the Fahy 
Committee informed the secretary of the Army that, among other 
flaws, 
the abolition of quotas to major commands for school selection is profligated 
by the retention of quotas in assignment to units, and thereby intensifies 
rather than eliminates unequal treatment and opportunities . ... The pro-
posed improvement of numerical utilization of Negroes in MOS of each field 
is dissoluted by the restricted utilization of the individual to the opportuni-
ties offered on a fixed basis to persons only of his race . . . . It is this Commit-
tee's best judgment that the . , . proposal fails to meet in any reasonable man-
ner the spirit and letter of the President'S Order. 
This intransigence was accompanied by an annoying tactical delay. 
The Army had proposed appointing a board to look into ongoing mat-
ters and encouraged the committee not to make a report to the presi-
dent until it convened and issued its own recommendations. From 
Kenworthy'S perspective this request was a slap in the face: "Now 
suddenly the Army suggests that the problem, which was being dis-
cussed at what amounts to a cabinet level, be turned over to a board 
of Army officers for review. The plain intimation is that the Army 
can handle this matter unilaterally, without further interference 
from the President's Committee."" Given the meager prospects indi-
cated by these stifling developments, it was anyone's guess how long 
true conversion to a fully integrated Army might take. By July of 
1949 Kenworthy and Fahy were taking no bets. 
The Fahy Committee sent Truman its interim report on July 27. 
The committee advised the president that the Army had met "some 
parts of our recommendations" but had not yet met the full require-
ments of Executive Order 9981. The committee had proposed four 
major revisions in the Army's present policy: 
I) Open up all classes of Army jobs to qualified personnel without 
regard to race; . 
2) open all courses in Army schools to qualified personnel without 
regard to race; 
3) assign and use personnel upon completion of school courses 
without regard to race; 
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4) abolish the racial quota, substituting a quota system based on 
the distribution of mental grades as determined by the General Clas-
sification Test. 
This four-point program, long the benchmark for Army compliance 
with Executive Order 9981, continued as the basis for controversy. 
The fourth demand remained least amenable to change. 
The committee informed the president that the racial quota issue 
had proven particularly vexing because the Army had previously 
agreed to drop the quota only if all three services were to adopt 
the same minimal standards of acceptance. Nevertheless, the interim 
report remained adamant on this issue: "The Committee is of the 
opinion that the Army should abolish the racial quota now. ,,48 
The Army's continued resistance may have given the commit-
tee pause for additional reflection. On August 8, 1949, Kenworthy as-
sured Fahy that the committee's proposed policy was appropriate. Af-
ter going over the files of the old McCloy Committee operations 
during World War II, the Fahy Committee's executive secretary, per-
haps self-servingly, said he had found "a history of unrelieved head-
aches." He lamented: "I cannot understand how the Army can defend 
its racial policy by appealing to experience. 1 was never more certain 
that we are on the right track. If our recommendations had been in 
effect in the twenty years between the wars, 1 feel certain that the 
Army would have had more efficient Negro troops. ,,'9 The committee 
still understood itself as making no more than sensibly moderate de-
mands. Its Army directives were never meant to "break up immedi-
ately its segregated units." All proposals were merely directed at 
"getting the best utilization out of more highly qualified Negroes in 
the Army. "so This rherorical tack was repeated over and over. 
A NEW INITIATIVE. On September 26 Judge Fahy informed the presi-
dent that there seemed to be agreement on all issues except the 
quota, and if actual implementation proceeded in accordance with 
the committee's intentions, then "great progress" was within reach . 
On September 30 Secretary of the Army Gray advised Secretary of 
Defense Johnson that he had developed new regulations, subject to 
the service secretary's concurrence, that would accede to the Fahy 
Committee's demands. Military Occupational Specialties would 
seemingly be opened to qualified personnel regardless of race; quotas 
for attending Army schools would ostensibly be abolished; promo-
tions would be handled on an "equal merit" system; ROTC students 
would train and remain together without racial reference; and a new 
board of senior Army officers would meet on a regular basis to review 
progress on the new policies. This new policy initiative did not im-
mediately break up existing segregation; rather, it seemed to assure 
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equal opportunity for qualified enlistees and personnel in existing 
units. Johnson issued a press release announcing these changes. The 
Fahy Committee, however, was unsure whether the new Army direc-
tive went "far enough" and implored the president not to comment 
publicly until a full committee assessment could be undertaken. 51 
Trying to sort out the implications of the newest Army proposal 
and the defense secretary's subsequent public endorsement proved, 
like everything else associated with these efforts, to be a bit of a trial, 
as minority affairs aide David K. Niles made clear in an October 5 
memorandum to Truman: "Fahy['s] committee reached an agreement 
with the army that assignment of qualified personnel to specialist 
occupations would be on the basis of merit and fitness without re-
gard to race or color. Yet the Army's program is evasive on this point, 
which the Fahy Committee feels is key to their entire objective .. .. 
[Moreover,] Secretary johnson's [press] release, covering this pro-
gram, is arousing a good deal of controversy, and has resulted in in-
quiries from a number of reporters, and letters and telegrams from 
interested organizations."" 
A "Further Interim Report to th~ President" reinforced Niles's as-
sessment. Issued on October 6 by Fahy on behalf of the committee, 
this report was directly occasioned by johnson's announcement of 
the new Army policy. Fahyobserved, "It is true that the new program 
is a step forward, but its effectiveness is seriously impaired by the 
omission to provide that, after the men have acquired their Military 
Occupational Specialties and have completed their school courses, 
they shall be assigned according to their qualifications and without 
regard to race or color." Although all parties antiCipated a "slow pro-
cess," Fahy argued, "that should not be a deterrent to the adoption of 
the assignment policy we have urged." 53 
The Further Interim Report addressed the problem of assignments 
bluntly. The opening of the Military Occupational Specialties would 
be nulliJled to a considerable degree by the failure of the program to provide 
that personnel, to whom these opportunities will be accorded, wiU be as-
signed without regard to race or color. Unless ass ignments are so made, and 
are not restricted as at present to Negro and overhead units, the principle of 
equality of treatment and opponunity is not carried forward and the man-
power of the Army is not utilized to best advantage. The Committee feels 
that this further logical step is required to effectuate the President's Execu· 
tive Order 9981 and the statement of the Secretary of Defense of April 6, 
1949.54 
Meanwhile, abolition of the quota system was still a bone of con-
tention. The intricacies of abolishing the racial quota are perhaps 
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best exemplified in Kenworthy's memorandum of October 29. He 
told the committee he was now in "an impossible situation" and 
described a breakdown in the "firm understanding with Gray and 
[Special Consultant to the Secretary of the Armyl Bendetsen and 
MacFadyen Isic] that P & A [Army Personnel and Administration] 
would work with the staff to try to solve the quota problem. The bot-
tlenecks are General Brooks, Director of P & A, and his number two, 
Colonel MacFadyen [sicl." Probative evidence of Army obstructionist 
policies was found in a "statement sent out by P & A to all command-
ing generals forbidding them to use Negroes except in Negro units 
and in 'Negro spaces' in overhead installations." Kenworthy con-
cluded: "I know from the best authority within P & A that its hope 
is that the Committee will submit its final recommendations-what 
its recommendations are they don't much care-and disband. ,, 55 
"A SLOW AND PRACTICAL PROCESS." An immoral and nefarious pol-
icy had become an albatross for the executive secretary. His enthusi-
asm and creativity in trying to circumvent, if not overcome, the 
forces against change were beginning to wear thin. Kenworthy and 
company were determined, however, to make sure that the long, hard 
road traveled thus far would indeed lead to the destination they 
had targeted. The import of their duties had been reinforced by a de-
monstratively committed and straightforward president. Because 
each skirmish in the battle had been hard won, there was little else 
to do but press ahead. 
Neither the utilization and assignment problem with Army occu-
pations and schools nor the general racial quota would slip away into 
the quiet night. Gray wrote Fahy on November 17: "I have repeat-
edly declared that the Army is prepared to adopt a substitute for the 
numerical quota if one could be devised which afforded assurance 
against a disproportion between Negro and other personnel within 
the Army in peace as weIl as in war time. After a most careful exami-
nation into the subject, 1 am compeIled to conclude that nothing has 
been suggested by your committee which approaches this require-
ment.,, 56 
Kenworthy remained adamant on the continuing inadequacy of the 
Army's schools policy: "The Committee very definitely stated to the 
President in its inteiim report of II October that it opposes further 
creation of Negro units and that its objective is 'the beginning of in-
tegration by a slow and practical process.' " Furthermore, Kenworthy 
complained, "The officer detailed to write the .. . special regulation 
has conceded that the regulation does not affect appreciably the 
Army's present policy on assignment and does not reflect the Com-
mittee's recommendations to the Army." " Kenworthy argued that 
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"the only way to make the opening of MOS and schools effective is to 
infiltrate gradually the qualified, school-trained Negroes into white 
units." The only remaining question was, "Does the Army intend to 
do this by the revised 1241,,58 
RAW POWER POLITICS . The intense wrangling continued until it 
sometimes spilled over into raw power polities pitting military 
against executive authority in particularly vexing, and sometimes ex-
cruciating, encounters. For example, Karl Bendetsen telephoned 
Charles Fahy on November 27 to inquire whether the committee 
would agree that the revision of 124 accurately reflected the policy statement 
issued by Secretary Gray and approved by Secretary Johnson on September 
30. Mr. Fahy replied .. . that he would by no means agree to such a proce-
dure, and he added that if the Army issued a revision of 124 to commanders, 
he would notify the White House of the Committee's disapproval; and fur-
thermore he would issue a statement to the press making it clear the Com-
mittee had not approved the Army's policy. If this were done, Mr. Fahy said, 
then a situation would arise which had so far been successfully avoided; i.e., 
a controversy in public. 
After this exchange, 
Mr. Bendetsen then asked whether Mr. Fahy meant that the Committee had 
the authority to prevent the Secretary of Defense from approving the Army's 
policy. Mr. Fahy replied that he was not trying to usurp the prerogatives of 
either Secretary Gray or Secretary Johnson, and that they, of course, had the 
right to issue an approved policy statement. The point he wished to make, 
however, was that the Committee operated under an executive order of the 
President, and that in the Committee's view the Army's policy did not meet 
the re~uirements of the policy expressed in the president's Executive Order 
9981 5 
As November 1949 drew to a close committee members were in-
creasingly anxious to produce public results. They feared additional 
encroachments on their power, not only through the now continuous 
Army subterfuges but also by the second-guessing they were receiv-
ing from Truman's advisors and an increasingly impatient Congress. 
It was a delicate, damnable, precariously frustrating enterprise. The 
committee's presidentially mandated low profile was now proving a 
liability rather than an asset. Many committee inembers pined for a 
public relations counteroffensive. 
The intricacies of the power relations are best revealed in the ongo-
ing correspondence. Committee member Dwight R. G. Palmer wrote 
Kenworthy: 
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There is every evidence that Secretary Gray and all his people think along 
the line of a Ifdisproportionatc" number of Negroes VS . whites . Well, this is 
the quota business. We discuss elimination of quota and they pull this "dis-
proportionate" angle. If you are going to continue to hold sessions with the 
Army people land I think you should) keep us advised in report form and look 
out you don't even halfway commit us to any subtle schemes of the Army. 
To date I have not seen a revised 11 124" nor any further comments since Judge 
Fahy referred to remarks by a Mr. Nash. Frankly, I am not sold on these 
"second string opinions." Such fellows have no responsibility to us nor can 
we sit by and le t them lIopinionize" about how we ought to handJe OUf job. 
We have members who believe some publicity must be forthcoming. Is such 
a suggestion to die on the vine? We oUght to do something.60 
Palmer's misgivings did not preclude White House advisors from 
issuing opinions on unresolved matters. The administration still 
favored quiet diplomacy. On December 9, 1949, Nash advised Ken-
worthy that "a public statement should be avoided" and that if the 
committee were still intent on making one, " then it should be as 
mild as possible." The committee's dissatisfaction with the matter 
of "assignment" in the proposed revisions to WD Circular 124, Nash 
advised, should be addressed in a memorandum to the Army and cop-
ied to the White House, whereupon the White House "would indicate 
to the Army that it should move to meet the recommendations of the 
President's Committee,n61 
Having publicly commissioned the Fahy Committee and having 
defined its miSSion, the president, of course, ultimately was held ac-
countable for the impasse. For example, Senator Ralph E. Flanders of 
Vermont wrote Truman: "From various sources I get the impression 
that your plan for doing away with racial segregation in the armed 
services is not making very much headway, particularly in the 
Army." Flanders issued what amounted to a threat: "The matter 
should, I believe, be looked into by a Congressional investigation if 
conditions are as I understand them to be and if they continue. It 
would seem better if you could make another effort to have your de-
sires followed so that a public investigation would be unnecessary." 
The president issued a curt reply: "I read your letter of the 13th with 
a great deal of interest . For your information, the program as outlined 
in the matter to which you refer, is proceeding very satisfactorily. 
Efforts are being made, of course, to cause us all the trouble possi-
ble in getting the plan to work. There are certain conditions which 
have to be met on a gradual basis. Eventually we will accomplish the 
purpose, if the busybodies will let us alone."" Other "busybodies" 
entered the fray. Appearing on Meet the Press, Secretary Gray was 
asked to explain why the Army, unlike its two sister services, had 
failed to reach resolution with the Fahy Committee. In a somewhat 
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self-serving defense, Gray denied he was making "trouble" for the 
president and argued forcefully that he was actually trying to revivify 
a process that had reached a "virtual standstill. ,,63 
Denouement-1950 
With the growing public perception that the president's committee 
seemed stymied, Congress moved to resolve the matter on its own. 
Truman and the defense establishment steeled for additional rhetori-
cal pressure. On January 12, 1950, Representative Jacob Javits IR-
N .Y.) introduced a resolution to create a Congressional Select Com-
mittee investigation of discrimination and segregation in the armed 
services. Javits complained that the services had been developing 
separate policies: "Persistent charges have been made that practices 
of segregation and discrimination continue in the Army. Nothing 
could be more useful as propaganda material to the Communist 
propagandists in the 'cold war.' '' In particular Javits maintained 
that communist propagandists in· West Germany, Western Europe, 
Asia, and Africa were having a field day over the dispute. And, he 
noted pointedly, "With Communist China as a propaganda base, seg-
regation and discrimination on grounds of race, creed or color in the 
United States can be used to win tens of millions to the Communist 
cause. 11M 
On January 16, 1950, the Army finally acquiesced, announcing its 
long-awaited revisions on WD Circular 124. The committee was 
pleased with the final wording of section 10 and subsections lOa, 
IOb.1 , and IOb.2, which addressed the contested issues of assignment 
and utilization. Fahy informed the president of these latest develop-
ments and attached the Army's revision. Three of the committee's 
four major recommendations had now been adopted. The final obsta-
cle to full implementation was the Army's racial quota system." 
Secretary of Defense Johnson felt the Fahy Committee, having 
served its purpose, should now be abolished. Johnson asked TIuman 
to turn the remaining issues over to the Defense Department, which 
would be responsible for submitting "semi-annual progress reports ." 
Opposed to abolition, the president's advisors issued a spirited de-
fense. Clark Clifford offered the president the following advice: "The 
elimination of racial quotas upon enlistment is still under discussion 
between the Committee and the Army. Even after a successful solu-
tion to that problem is agreed upon, Dave Niles and I think that the 
Fahy Committee should be continued, possibly on an advisory rather 
than an operating basis, for an indefinite period, so th.at it will be in 
a position to see that there is not a gap between policy and an ad-
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ministration of policy in the Defense Establishment." TI-uman, in a 
marked demonstration of leadership, decided to continue the com-
mittee's mission until the quota issue was resolved. 66 
On February 7, 1950, David Niles informed the president of 
"friendly and encouraging talk on the Fahy Committee's remain-
ing recommendation- the substitution of an achievement quota for 
the present racial quota." Niles reported the latest committee pro-
posal would now require all recruits to score a minimum of 90 on the 
GCT test, make it difficult for low-score personnel to reenlist, and 
eliminate the racial quota of "one Negro for every nine whites." 
Niles deemed the proposal" fair," "sensible, " and" gradual" because 
"Negro units ... would not be abolished overnight." Such rhetorical 
characterizations were in keeping with Truman's stated goals. Thus, 
this latest report must have been most welcome." 
Truman, however, seems to have hedged his bet a bit regarding the 
outcome of the final agreement between the Fahy Committee and the 
Army. Secretary Gray seems to have requested and received approval 
from the president and Secretary Johnson to return to the old system 
if it became necessary. On March I, 1950, Gray wrote TI-uman: "If, 
as a result of a fair trial of this new system, there ensues a dispropor-
tionate balance of racial strengths in the Army, it is my understand-
ing that I have your authority to return to a system which will, in 
effect, control enlistments by race."" 
Nonetheless, on February 24, 1950, even before the final agreement 
between the committee and the Army was reached, Kenworthy 
would exuberantly inform Eric Severeid of CBS News that 
What is going on is a kind of quiet social revolution about which the coun· 
try knows nothing. We feel that over a period of time this opportunity for 
whites and Negroes to live and work together is going to have an incalculable 
effect upon the civil population. And it has all been done by concentrating 
on the business of job opportunities, and also by not making a public hue and 
cry, but sitting down with the services and persuading them that they were 
making inefficient use of the manpower they had. The Committee main-
tained that the services could not afford this human wastage."· 
On March 13, 1950, Fahy informed Niles that a confidential agree-
ment had been reached with the Army on March 6 to abolish the 
racial quota and that the committee was now in the process of pre-
paring its formal final report.7O 
The final Fahy Committee report, Freedom to Serve, outlined the 
monumental struggle to desegregate the armed forces and the Army 
in particular. By defending and supporting the Fahy Committee, 
Truman helped overturn Jim Crow in the federal government. The 
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president's victory demonstrated a pronounced acumen: '''politics and 
morality merged to produce justice. ,,71 Dalfiume summarizes: 
'Ituman's issuance of the executive order and his insistence that its purpose 
was to end segregation weakened resistance in the armed services. Further-
more, the President's backing for all of the Fahy group's recommendations to 
the Army enabled the committee to overcome the almost total opposition to 
integration in this service. Throughout this period it was the support of ci-
vilian leaders within the military establishment for integration that proved 
decisive. The significance of the committee's achievements is that at its be-
ginning the Army had an official policy of segregation and at its conclusion 
the Army was officially committed to integration." 
The president was quite pleased with the Fahy Committee's ac-
complishments. Truman observed that equality of opportunity in the 
armed forces would improve "military efficiency" and "strengthen .. . 
our entire national life." This was a decisive step because it helped 
establish the fledgling Truman Doctrine: "The free nations of the 
world are counting on our strength to sustain them as they mobilize 
their energies to resist Communist imperialism. ,,73 Thus opened the 
widening gyre of civil rights and the cold war. 
Sociopolitical and Cultural Legacy 
Powerful political and social forces in effect at the end of the Sec-
ond World War made it impossible to ignore or perpetuate the status 
quo in U.S. race relations. Blacks were becoming an important politi-
cal force at the ballot box and were growing increasingly unhappy 
with the abrogation of their civil rights at home and abroad. Their 
pleas for civil rights soon became entangled in the larger propaganda 
chips of cold war diplomacy. This process was a creation of presi-
dents, advisors, politiCians, and black leadership alike. For Truman 
these developments had profound consequences. Even if his political 
instincts told him to avoid African American rights, historical for-
tunes flung him into the vortex. 
Truman, palpably aware that his presidential responsibilities called 
him to a new and greater accountability, understood that constitu-
tional protections had to be afforded to each and every American 
regardless of race, creed, or color. Early on the president seemed ro 
sense that the separate-but-equal doctrine was a method of enshrin-
ing discrimination and, therefore, had become a "contradiction" that 
had no place in contemporary American society. Truman's role in the 
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federal government's extension of civil rights to its citizens was clari-
fied in his efforts to introduce civil rights legislation and, failing the 
substantive congressional hurdles at the time, was codified through 
executive action ensuring equal opportunity in the armed services. 
Civil rights legislation almost cost Truman the 1948 election. Execu-
tive action earned him an eminent place in civil rights history. 
With the May 22, 1950, issuance of its final report, Freedom to 
Serve, the Fahy Committee disbanded at the president's request. The 
Korean War began in June of 1950. During that war, unlike those that 
preceded it, the old bugaboo of inferior black units was displaced 
as field commanders pushed toward, rather than away from, integra-
tion. As William Pemberton recounts, "By October 1953, 95 percent 
of black soldiers served in integrated units." 74 The groundwork laid 
by the Fahy Committee made this significant development possible. 
For all practical purposes, "by the end of 1954, segregation and dis-
crimination were virtually eliminated from the internal organiza-
tion of the active military forces.,, 75 As Berman summarizes, Execu-
tive Order 9981 "was undoubtedly President Truman's greatest civil 
rights achievement-and it illustrates the intelligent use of execu-
tive power to change, within admittedly narrow limits, a racist struc-
ture.,, 76 As Milton Konvitz notes, "in the history of civil rights in the 
United States this order ranks among the most important steps taken 
to end racial discrimination. li n 
Just as important, the move to reorganize and unify the military 
service to set up the postwar defense establishment, when writ large, 
became a test of the United States's ability not only to rebound from 
the war but also to assume its symbolic role as the undisputed leader 
of the emerging new world order. Under the heady aegis of a dawning 
Pax Americana, successive administrations assumed that if demo-
cratic principle ruled, then global democratic participation would fol-
low. In hindsight, this political premise proved a recurrent, some-
times monstrously hazardous, rhetorical theme in much cold war 
diplomacy. For in Truman's inauguration of the cold war, we find one 
of the early rhetorical links to u .S. civil rights as central to the image 
and consistency of American foreign policy. This argument was in-
troduced by Tl"uman, used in his rationale for his appointment of the 
Fahy Committee, and employed by successive administrations and 
civil rights advocates ruike. Preserving human rights at home became 
a linchpin for the attractive presentation of Western-style democracy 
and rhetorical themes underlining, if not exacerbating, the emerging 
global competition with the Soviets. Thus, the familiar dualist nature 
of cold war foreign policy address, and the attendant bipolarities of 
arguing good and evil systems of government, received some of their 
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first rhetorical rehearsals in the struggle to integrate the armed ser-
vices" Civil rights was a part of the cold war before Brown v. Board 
of Education. 
In the great tradition of American pragmatism, the president, the 
Fahy Committee, and the Army would finally converge on rhetorical 
values all parties held in high esteem: maximum efficiency as the key 
to national security. The effective utilization of manpower reigned 
uppermost in the arguments from all directions. Such normative cri-
teria helped push principle into implementation and action. The in-
tegration of the armed forces, perhaps little understood for its enor-
mity at the time, is now perceived as a monumental step that paved 
the way for the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. 
On the other hand, the Achilles' heel of contemporary civil rights 
discourse is perhaps also traced to the cold war. The cold war impera-
tives toward "maximum efficiency" and the preservation of "na-
tional security" no longer buttress today's civil rights arguments. 
The contemporary assault on affirmative action programs, for exam-
ple, may be a part of the post-<:old war, post-Soviet Union environ-
ment. Without an "enemy" to hate, we may be prone to lose our 
grounding. When Americans are persuaded to moral action based on 
xenophobic and nationalistic sensibilities, the moral moorings secur-
ing civil rights seem rather tenuous. Moreover, once the "enemy" is 
vanquished or disappears, the individual may have a hard time sup-
porting a positive personal ideology and endorsing any governmental 
program of action. And the collective, having grown weary of the 
discourse of individual civil rights, may retreat from any discussion 
of human rights. Having known for so long what to be against, it may 
be decidedly harder now for Americans to discern what one can and 
must be for, individually and collectively. The recent court cases sig-
naling a rollback on affirmative action may be harbingers that we as 
a nation are ready to fold our social tent on civil rights and traverse a 
long desert of the soul that may have little to do with the so-called 
abuses in the present system. Of course, such speculation needs fur-
ther development, refinement, and support. 7• 
Arguments against desegregating the armed services bear similari-
ties to contemporary arguments against haVing gays in the mili-
tary, women in combat roles, and, of course, affirmative action and 
the use of quota systems. What is perhaps startling is that many of 
these arguments have changed little in over fifty years. The rhetorical 
history documented here echoes the early roots of discussions on 
affirmative action and the use (and abuse) of quota systems. It also 
helps explain how affirmative action, as a concept, gradually but 
perceptibly gained a foothold in the country's conscience and in its 
institutions as a viable method of ensuring equality of opportunity 
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for all Americans. Finally, I would like to address briefly a larger cul-
tural legacy. With the fiftieth anniversary of the age of thermonu-
clear weaponry, inaugurated by the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, Harry Truman and his administration became the subjects 
of renewed controversy, especially under the recent scrutiny of revi-
sionists. But one might contrast those disputes with Truman's ac-
complishments as outlined in this chapter and reflect a bit further. 
The nation also recently celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Truman presidency. Like most people, Harry S. 'Truman experienced 
success and failure-and mostly with mixed results. On his efforts to 
integrate the armed services, however, there was a particularly happy 
alchemy. Both immediate and long-term good was achieved, and that 
is a legacy anyone can applaud. 
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